

Readers' Forum

Whose God in History?

Neal W. Kramer's essay "Looking for God in History," *SUNSTONE*, 8, 1 and 2, pp. 15-17, is one of the most sophisticated attacks on academic history produced by a faithful Latter-day Saint. He is far better read than Boyd Packer but his point is the same. Mormon history is best written with an eye to the *fact* that, "the hand of God is mightily revealed in the history of this church. . . ." To re-establish God in history, Kramer attacks the "positivism" of academic history through linguistic analysis. He concludes that the rules and conventions of language make the positivist dream of "absolute knowledge" a "fleeting dream of the scientist." If academic history is a mere convention, then history written by the faithful who experience God is as valid if not more valid than it.

I know of few students of the philosophy of science and of history who would not agree with the limitations which Kramer places on the attainment of absolute knowledge, but his caricature of history and science as naively positivistic does little service to him or to those disciplines. Thoughtful scientists and historians see their branches of learning not so much as a search for truth as systems of rules which allow theories to be evaluated in terms of sense data. In science, the predictive power and/or usefulness (will it get a rocket to the moon?) of a theory determine its acceptance. The tentative nature of "scientific truth" is seen in the changes of world view which punctuate the history of science. In history, theories are judged by how well they account for the various pieces of data essential to the question being asked. Though science and history were profoundly affected by positivism, neither is in the last half of the twentieth century as uncritically positivistic as Kramer would have us believe.

What seems most to bother Kramer about academic history is its refusal to

recognize the hand of God in events. The reason for this aspect of academic history is both clear and persuasive. What sense data exist to reveal God's hand? If such data existed, whose God would it reveal? Because God is not sensible, data dealing with him is nonsense and speculative. Were historians to admit such nonsense data, they would lose much of their shared universe of discourse which allows them to evaluate their theories. Personal, inspired speculation with no data would become as valid as hard documents and chaos would replace orderly criticism.

Though academic history can not consider God as a causal factor, it has no difficulty in considering the belief in God and mystical experiences as factors at play in peoples' lives. Constantine's conversion, Mohammed's conversations with Gabriel, and Joseph Smith's visions are all data to be accounted for in historical explanations. The faithful and the faithless can evaluate the success or failure of such explanations in making the lives of religious figures intelligible.

Kramer might reasonably be asked, is academic history as hostile to faithful history as faithful history is to academic history? I believe that the answer is no. The academic sees faith-promoting, in-house history as a valid interpretation of religious mythology. The perceptions of the faithful become vehicles to help the academic outsider understand what the faith means to the believer. The academic must view faithful history critically, but he should not view it with hostility.

Of special interest to me as an outsider, an academic historian, is the peculiar historical orientation of Mormonism. Throughout the nineteenth century and into the Visitors' Centers today, one sees an explicit positivistic theory of history propounded by "The Church." It is almost an article of faith that a study of history will prove to the open

minded the reality of the apostasy and the necessity of the restoration. Mark E. Peterson does not hesitate to use histories of Christianity to prove the worldliness and apostasy of Catholicism in *Which Church is Right?* Kramer and Packer, however, seem to recoil from academic studies of Mormonism which may tend to show worldly factors at work in the restored church. Mormons cannot consistently use history to show that some theological points are tenable to historical verification and then selectively refuse to allow that Mormonism is in those points capable of historical falsification.

From the position which Kramer seeks to defend, Jews, Catholics, Protestants, witches, etc., can and should find that their deity "is mightily revealed" in their history. This is, of course, true and acceptable, but religious subjectivity is not the only path open to history. The academic historian must see things from outside the plenitude of spirit which pervades insider traditions. His job is to make such traditions intelligible to outsiders. The insiders already know the truth of their tradition. Absolute knowledge therefore does not reside in the tentative, plausible explanations of the academic historian but rather in the "divinely inspired" insider histories of the faithful. Kramer does not need to attack a caricature of academic history to justify the absolutist interpretations of his religion. They are justified by the beliefs of the faithful. To them academic history is secular foolishness. He does, however, need to come to grips with the Mormon theory of history which in its positivism allows aspects of theology to be tested historically.

Michael T. Walton
Salt Lake City, Utah

Dem Bohns

Having read BYU political scientist David Bohn's essay on the illusory nature of historiographical objectivity (*SUNSTONE*, May-June 1983), I'm left wondering whether it's not a departmental project to attack the "New Mormon History" and its practitioners, with the baton having now passed from Louis Midgley to Professor Bohn. But perhaps everyone needs a hobby, and this is probably a morally more acceptable one than deer hunting or participating in pyramid schemes.

Bohn explains how historians are trapped by their categories and by their times, which leads them to force

meaning upon the facts they collect. In fact, they only collect the facts that fit into their world views and grand schemes. I gather that Bohn thinks that what he's got to say is news to historians. Well, his discussion of the problems of evidence and explanation bring to mind the lectures I heard in my graduate historical methods class at the University of Utah, that bastion of secular humanism. Going back beyond that, when I was a mere youth of 22 and an undergraduate at the same institution, I was assigned to read Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, which Bohn approvingly cites and which pretty much lays out the whole picture of how world view influences scientists (I wonder if that includes *political* scientists). But getting back to graduate school, the same professor who lectured about evidence in another class was careful to have us consider several schools of interpretation regarding U.S. colonial history, including the causes of the Revolution and the factors involved in the writing and ratification of the Constitution. He concluded the course with an admission that there's no final, absolute explanation, that different sets of assumptions will lead to different visions of the past. I must admit that I found this analysis a bit depressing, as it argues for a more relativistic view than most people find acceptable and certainly more so than I find comfortable. It struck me at the time that part of the problem is that reality is so complex that no single scholarly approach can hope to encompass it.

So maybe Bohn isn't so far off when he says that the best that finite human efforts at scholarship can achieve is "bounded relativism," although I'd like to know what sets the bounds. It seems to me that the problem is once you admit some degree of relativism, what stops you from going all the way and saying all explanations are of equal value? Even on Professor Bohn's terms, he can't very well claim any greater certitude or objectivity for historical projects based on Mormon "categories of belief as a theme," contrary to what Neal Kramer had to say in his shot at the "New Mormon History" in the previous issue (*SUNSTONE*, March-April 1983). (Parenthetically, when I read Kramer's essay, I experienced the un-Christian temptation to send a xerox copy to his doctoral committee chairman at the University of Chicago with a query as to whether a person so opposed to the methods of scholarship can really be happy as a grad student at a major university.

But I bit my tongue and saved that jibe for this letter instead.)

Now personally I feel that people ought to be free to approach the writing of history from any angle they choose, and if they want to study religious history, they ought to deal with religious matters as they come across them in their work. What I can't quite figure out is how they can proceed except to present evidence and draw conclusions from it to support a particular interpretation. Hopefully the interpretation will follow from the facts and their own rational processes, but if they want to draw their interpretations from the scriptures or a talk they heard in conference, I guess that's okay too. It strikes me that most Mormon historians, Old or New, don't seem to be *trying* to force theories or models on their facts, but rather spend most of their time lining facts up, one after another, sometimes without drawing any conclusions at all. (Maybe I've been reading *BYU Studies* too much.) So maybe Kramer's advice isn't so far out in left field (or right field, probably)—let one's subject give his own view in his own words and then the historian just bears his testimony that what the person said is true. Of course that implies that one can only use sources which say things one feels able to bear testimony to. And there's the problem. I find it a little hard to be more comfortable with a historian

who wants to tell me what God was thinking about a particular event than I am with a historian who has delusions of being a sociologist, anthropologist, or psychologist. After all, as Bohn reminds us, history cannot *prove* spiritual claims, which require personal validation coming from a higher source.

But enough of this arcane theorizing. *SUNSTONE* recently has run a whole series of articles discussing the theoretical possibilities of history. Let's get down to cases. Maybe I could understand better what everyone is trying to say if they could point out some specific books or articles that I could read. By the way, in the last general conference at least two General Authorities warned against those (historians, obviously) who point out the flaws in the lives of past Church leaders, rather than appreciating the great work which they did. I can agree that there's a great need for a balanced approach, and I've heard this accusation tossed about a lot lately, but no one ever identifies the books and articles where this hatchet-job history takes place. I'd like to propose yet another *SUNSTONE* contest (with Correlation perhaps putting up the prize money), with the winner being the person who can submit the longest list of such works, a condition being that besides author and title, the contestant must also point to specific passages which justify

DATES TO REMEMBER

The 1984 *SUNSTONE* THEOLOGICAL SYMPOSIUM will be held on August 23rd through the 25th at the Hotel Utah in Salt Lake City. Plan to include the symposium in your summer activities. Further details will be forthcoming.

their inclusion in his/her list.

Fordham Hurley
Taylorsville, Utah

Bohna Fide Article

David Earl Bohn's article, "No Higher Ground" (SUNSTONE, May-June 1983) raises important issues about the writing of Mormon history, but also distorts what many Mormon historians are trying to accomplish. Bohn appears to believe that academic historians aim toward an approach of total neutrality toward the object of their inquiry, much in the manner of older and now outmoded "positivistic"

approaches of the physical sciences. This is a subtle though serious misreading of the historical enterprise. Although I can speak with authority only for myself, I believe that no reputable historian, if understood fully in context, would argue that *total* objectivity is possible. Rather, historians do their best to achieve the fullest and most comprehensive analysis of their topics. Far from being dogmatists or absolutists, historians are aware that simply to be alive is to have perspectives and experiences which influence our perceptions of the world. The point is to try to come as

close as possible to a fair and balanced assessment of events, while recognizing that we will inevitably fall short of this goal in some respects.


Historians do have failings. For example, Bohn is right that much, but certainly not all, academic historical writing is biased against taking religious movements seriously on their own terms. I have repeatedly encountered writers who assume that certain religious claims are so obviously untrue that they do not merit serious investigation. Such a narrow-minded viewpoint is not held either by myself or by leading Latter-day Saint historians of my acquaintance. Indeed, one of the major concerns underlying my work is that as much of the evidence as possible be investigated before conclusions are reached. Bohn and some Mormon conservatives may not like the specific conclusions that historians eventually reach, but this is very different from suggesting that I or other Mormon historians exclude valid perspectives and categories of evidence from our investigation.

When Bohn implies that one's perspective must in some sense predetermine one's conclusions, he is only partly right. Certainly one needs to be able to define a problem in order to collect appropriate data to begin to answer it effectively. But the answer itself is not necessarily predetermined wholly by the question asked. Any investigator who is sincerely interested in determining what happened in the past will continually test out different hypotheses and seek new evidence in attempting to explain and understand events. For example, if one were to hypothesize initially that Joseph Smith's visions might have been due to epileptic seizures (one example used by Bohn), this hypothesis could be tested to see if the evidence appeared to support it or not. Since in this case the evidence does not appear to support the hypothesis, the investigator could then proceed to look at a wide range of additional approaches in order to develop a more comprehensive explanation.

I am frankly puzzled at just what overall conclusions Bohn is stumbling toward when he goes beyond simply stating commonplace historiographic generalizations. He says that he is not nihilistic, yet much of the thrust of his argument moves in just such a direction. Although total certainty or agreement is unlikely about any complex issue, this should not discourage us from doing our best to

SUBSCRIBE!

TO THE SUNSTONE MAGAZINE



A must for every thoughtful Mormon, **Sunstone** is a diverse and relevant bimonthly magazine of LDS history, fiction, arts, humor, theology, personal essays, interviews, and poetry. Praised for its graphic quality as well as content, **Sunstone** is scholarly and penetrating yet readable and affirmative.

Send \$18.00 for a one year subscription to **SUNSTONE FOUNDATION**
P.O. BOX 2272 Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

be as fair as possible in considering various explanations. Such a sincere search for understanding is not "positivistic" or reductionistic, but quite the contrary. I am somewhat baffled that Bohn appears to think that his historiographic ruminations are directed against the reductionism of historians when, to my eye, they would seem more logically to be directed against the reductionism of the writers of dogmatic polemic, whether that polemic be historical or theological.

The biggest problem I have with writers of supposedly "faith-promoting" Mormon history is not with their framework *per se*, but rather with their failure to consider fairly the full range of available evidence and interpretation. They, not the historians, start with their minds already made up about what they will find. The result tends to be purely apologetic writing pitched to the lowest common denominator—writing which "talks down" to Saints as though they were mere children. I continue to believe that such writing is neither good religion nor good history.

Lawrence Foster
Georgia Institute of Technology

Still Another Bohn to Pick

In the last two issues of *SUNSTONE*, two writers appear to be trying to defend Mormon orthodoxy against the onslaught of what David Earl Bohn calls "The New Mormon Historians" (David Earl Bohn, "No Higher Ground," *SUNSTONE* [May-June 1983]: pp. 26-32. See also Neal W. Kramer, "Looking for God in History," *SUNSTONE* [Jan.-April 1983]: pp. 15-17). Both Bohn and Neal W. Kramer seem to believe that by mentioning the difficulties, ambiguities, and general limitations of language and repeating the now-commonplace list of deficiencies in positivism as an approach to history, they have somehow vindicated the traditional approaches to Mormon history. Bohn is the more careful as well as the more thoughtful of the two. After a rather nihilistic attack on historians in which he asserts that, if you reject the canons of positivism, then "the historians' distinction between 'good history' and 'bad history' evaporates" (p. 27), he arrives at the somewhat contradictory and exceedingly weak conclusion that the "New Mormon Historians [have failed] to make a convincing case against the possibility of an honest and quality Mormon history that takes its own categories of belief as a theme" (p. 32). If there is

no way to distinguish good from bad history, one wonders what Bohn could possibly mean by a "quality Mormon history." Moreover, if the strongest argument that can be made in favor of Mormon orthodoxy is that its critics have not proven that it must necessarily involve one in dishonesty and bad quality history, then one can hardly celebrate the vindication of that orthodoxy.

Bohn has indeed summarized several reasons why a thoughtful historian should reject positivism. There are, however, three closely related failures in his article. First, he has failed to show that any of the New Mormon Historians he lists are positivists. As a former student of Professor McMurrin (whom Bohn labels as a positivist), I strongly doubt the appropriateness of the label. I would be very surprised if Professor McMurrin would label himself a positivist. Since I am less familiar with the philosophical views of the others mentioned by Bohn, I cannot comment on the appropriateness of the label.

The second inadequacy of Bohn's article is that it failed to show how, even if the tenets of positivism are indefensible and even if all of these New Mormon Historians are positivists, their specific assertions that run counter to Mormon orthodoxy are undermined. When, as a young LDS seminary student, I read my first critical account of the Mountain Meadows Massacre, I went to my seminary teacher to ask about it. He produced a volume of Mormon Church history which denied the involvement of Mormon Church members or officials in this massacre. Regardless of the adequacy or inadequacy of positivism, regardless of Bohn's arguments on subjectivity, objectivity or "bounded relativism," a set of events occurred at Mountain Meadows in 1857. Even with Bohn's "bounded relativism" it *must* be the case that either Juanita Brooks in her classic account of the massacre is fundamentally misinformed and/or misrepresenting the facts or my seminary teacher and the Mormon history he showed me were misinformed and/or misrepresenting the facts. After studying hermeneutics, cultural differences, and the ambiguity of language (all factors Bohn feels vindicate traditional Mormon history), I conclude that the Mormons in 1857 may have felt very differently about the massacre than I do; it undoubtedly had an entirely different significance for them than it has for me; but I also conclude that

there is a certain stubborn objectivity about the killing of scores of men, women and children that will not go away despite Bohn's appeal to hermeneutics and his attack on positivism. Either men, women and children were killed by Mormons or they weren't. We must agree on that common core of objective facts or we cannot even compare different interpretation, or differences in assessments of the facts. Surely Bohn believes that there is a fundamental difference between the elephants I describe for him after a visit to the zoo and the proverbial pink elephants described by a person suffering from delirium tremors. Regardless of the adequacy of the way in which positivism explains objectivity, virtually all of us know that some notion of objectivity must be adopted. Certain types of psychoses are no more than a loss of any mental tie to such objectivity. So a critique of positivism does not obviate the charge that many traditional church historians have written accounts which have distorted or altered objective facts.

My third criticism of Bohn's article applies also to Kramer's article and to most of the writings of the New Mormon Historians as well (at least to that part of their writings that I have read). When Bohn attacks the epistemological views of positivists, he appears to believe that discrediting positivism somehow vindicates the use of "visions," "prophesies," or the "word of God" generally, as a source of knowledge about historical events. Repeating the arguments against one particular epistemological or methodological approach (positivism) does absolutely nothing to make a convincing case for communication with God as a source of factual knowledge about our world of experience, either present or past.

The fact is that any independent, thinking academician who is also religious must attempt to come to grips with the relationship between her or his religious experience and her or his historical or social-scientific views about the world. Neither Bohn nor Kramer appear even to attempt to do this. On the other hand, in so far as I have read their writings, neither do the New Mormon Historians. Like Bohn and Kramer, I have wondered just which tenets of traditional Mormonism these New Mormon Historians accept and which they reject. And if I knew this, I would wonder how they intellectually integrate these religious tenets into their secular theories and assessments

of facts.

There have been, of course, a large number of intellectuals who have attempted to understand this relationship. Most generally, they have interpreted religious scriptures, rites and rituals as metaphorical communications about, or sharings of, religious experiences when such experiences cannot be described or communicated in the same manner as the ordinary experience that can be apprehended with the senses and the intellect and that we generally refer to as objective. Some Christian churches are sufficiently flexible to permit the intellectual to interpret scriptures, rites and rituals in this manner. I do not know if the Mormon church has this flexibility.

As a youth in Mormon seminary, I remember when I asked my teacher about God communicating with the prophets. I asked him if God actually spoke in the same manner as you and I speak. If a prophet had a tape recorder, could he record God's voice? Would it be in English? With a Utah accent? Or would the prophet merely have a religious experience of the type that most of us have, an experience that is not easily translated into ordinary language. If so, then each of us would have to judge for ourselves the meaning we got from the prophet's metaphorical communication of his religious experience. My seminary teacher warned me that I should pray to God to help me remove them. I did, but to no avail.

The composer Anton Bruckner once said that his symphonies were attempts to communicate to others some aspects of his religious experiences. Bruckner's religion has always been much more comprehensible to me than that of Ezra Taft Benson or Boyd K. Packer. And since throughout my academic career I have been an intellectual opponent of positivism, the attacks on positivism by Bohn and Kramer have absolutely no impact on this judgment. When I hear the ethereal beauty and sublime power of Bruckner's ninth symphony, I believe he is communicating a message from God. When I read the hard-hearted, reactionary social, economic, and political views of Benson or the blatant anti-intellectualism of Packer, I cannot believe that God could be involved. Despite the efforts of the New Mormon Historians, or such academic Mormons as Bohn and Kramer, I still do not have the slightest evidence that an inquiring, open-minded, academic historian or

social scientist can be accommodated with the Mormon church in such a manner that the academic both maintains her or his intellectual integrity and simultaneously satisfies her or his need for spiritual communion.

E.K. Hunt
University of Utah

An Ode to Free Will

In her article, "Toward a Mormon Concept of Original Sin" (SUNSTONE 8:3), Sister Allred appears to have misconstrued the importance of the Atonement for Mormon theology. The Atonement is central to (apostate) Christianity simply because original sin is likewise central therein. But neither is central to Mormonism.

"Atonement"—restoring the whole, putting the fragmented back together—operates in Christianity to rectify the horrendous cosmic error, the Fall, which (in Orthodox Christianity) apparently catches God by surprise and necessitates Jesus' belatedly becoming the cosmic tool to correct that unforeseen mistake. Orthodox Christianity here ignores the scriptures which make Jesus an integral part of the plan of salvation, e.g. the "Lamb slain from the foundation of the world." These scriptures render the Fall a cosmic necessity, while Christianity has God expecting Adam and Eve to live eternally without sin in the Garden of Eden.

Mormonism, by denying the evil or mistaken implications of the Fall (a fall "upwards," as Sterling Sill puts it), needs no atonement by Jesus to correct fundamental cosmic error. Rather we see the Fall as a launching of mankind into full freedom, a blessing of unlimited opportunity for personal growth and education.

Mortality with its necessary "opposition in all things" provides concrete dilemmas enough without describing it, as does Allred, as "inevitability of sin." Mortality is *par excellence* the place where individual free will is to be practiced and learned. Salvation is thereby *earned*.

Allred rejects the foregoing nonsinful Fall as inconsistent with the scriptures. She is largely correct; Pauline theology appears to be expressly contrary to Mormon theology at this point. And I include in my notion of Pauline theology Joseph Smith's earliest pronouncements in the Book of Mormon and elsewhere. Joseph may have made some of these statements mistakenly or inadvertently while under the

influence of Pauline theology. But in his later years, Joseph rejected Pauline assumptions and felt no reluctance to abandon whole sections of scripture as well.

The solution, then, to the conflict (which Allred correctly sees) between the necessary and good Fall and the scriptures is to simply ignore the scriptures. Of course, we don't want to ignore the *original* scriptures or primitive Christian views, but we know that the *present* scriptures have been tampered with and are biased in favor of a corrupt Christianity (see the *Cambridge History of the Bible*, pp. 265, 284-85, 295-96, 339). Allred has apparently been led astray by the present New Testament/Pauline emphasis upon the evil implications of the Fall. I suspect the truly Primitive Christian views were Mormon, not Orthodox Christian.

The "universality of sin" identified by Allred is statistical (the result of the sheer number of free agents making their own decisions), not "inevitable." It is Jesus' resurrection, not his suffering nor death which is efficacious as atonement. We learn from our individual experiences and pay for our own sins until we learn to act correctly. There is no original sin. We are morally neutral (being uncreated of God, who was himself not sinless during his mortality), thus free to choose our own character and eternal destiny.

The whole purpose of both the Fall and the plan of salvation is the enhancement of individual free will, culminating in the final judgment, in which each will account for his use of that will. Thus, free will (with final judgment) is *the* central gospel doctrine, not atonement.

In the same issue, Eugene England presents his "Paradox of Selfhood," which mistakenly solemnizes the abrogation of individualism. His erroneous simplification has the Church always the winner of the conflict, with the individual binding himself to it in "painful transcendence."

Why can't the Church official seek to "transcend" the "painful paradox" of his mistaken inspiration by confessing his erstwhile error? Why can't Church leaders admit error? That they may be occasionally inspired by direct revelation does not arrogate to them the myth of infallible inspiration. By refusing to challenge their own sources of inspiration Church leaders perpetuate the myth of infallible inspiration. Learning such discernment may prevent the kind of error Apostle Richards made in mistakenly prophesying the Willie

handcart company into their own destruction. Brigham Young publicly blasted Richards for his prophetic stupidity, but how did that assure the Saints that repeat performances by Richards (or other Church leaders) would not occur? Why wasn't Apostle Richards required to write letters of apology to each member or family of the Willie Company?

England has failed to realize that (1) life may not be "tragic" at the heart of it; (2) the tragedy of the paradox may be unnecessary where the Church pronouncement or policy is simply wrong; (3) individuals who transcend the paradox by suffering higher enlightenment in binding themselves to the community is what Roman Catholics and others have been doing for centuries, an act which tells us nothing about the truthfulness of the community; (4) painful dilemmas do not lead inexorably to enlightenment, especially where one horn of the dilemma is error; (5) paradox may not be the ultimate explanation of life, for paradox (in my opinion) is a confession of inexplicability, and admission that life and the gospel cannot be integrated into meaningful synthesis.

Cummings, whom England criticizes, has correctly simplified the paradox of selfhood into its primary constituent—free will; the ability to choose—even against the pronouncements of Church authorities. Cummings is correct: The profundity of choice is not simplified by avoiding it through "suffering transcendence," as England recommends.

Personal responsibility, of course, awaits those who choose (either direction) with consequences of eternal dimension. But isn't the individual *ever* justified and sometimes totally moral in opposing a Church pronouncement or policy? As an original founder of *Dialogue*, England must know that individual responsibility ultimately supercedes community interests.

England's praise of "the need to be forced" betrays his begging of the real conflict.

Gerry L. Ensley
Los Alamitos, California

Agency at the Heart

As a thought-provoking essay, Janice Allred's article on Original Sin was excellent (SUNSTONE, May-June 1983). I wish, however, her theological arguments had been as compelling as her desire to justify Christ's atonement for Mormons. As she states, "the revelations of the

prophets should provide the truths from which we proceed," but no clear doctrine on the subject exists aside from the second Article of Faith. Brigham Young once averred, "The Savior came . . . to redeem the earth and the children of men from original sin . . . committed by our first parents" (*Journal of Discourses*, June 1867). And Orson Pratt taught, "Adam transferred death to his posterity, not for any sin that they had committed, but as a consequence of his own sin" (*The Seer*, p. 97). Even latter-day scripture seems to

teach original sin (Moses 6:54-55).

On the other hand, Wilford Woodruff taught, "Adam and Eve came to this world to perform exactly the part they acted in the Garden of Eden; and I will say, they were ordained of God to do what they did" (*Discourses of Wilford Woodruff*, p. 233). Joseph Fielding Smith added, "Adam made the decision, in fact the only decision that he could make" (*Answers to Gospel Questions*, 4:81). And Marion G. Romney summed up this "softened

continued on page 42

Announcing the Sunstone Sketchbook.

Too often, anthologies and collections of Mormon visual art represent the voice of the critic or compiler rather than of the artist himself. **Sunstone** wants to provide Mormon artists the opportunity to express themselves, their creative feelings, and their relationship to the Church and gospel unencumbered by commentary.

Future issues will devote 2-3 pages highlighting the work of an artist whose life or work represents Mormonism, as well as comments on the work by the artist. All work will be reproduced in black and white so line art is preferred; continuous tone pieces will also be accepted. Artwork submitted must be the artist's own and should be accompanied by sufficient return postage.

Send artwork, a brief biographical sketch, and a paragraph commenting on your work to SUNSTONE, P.O. Box 2272, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110