

# TOWARD “PSYCHOLOGICALLY INFORMED” MORMON HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY

By Gary James Bergera

AS SELF-REFLECTIVE MEN AND women, all of us encounter moments in our lives when the burden of humanity weighs heavily upon us, when we must confront as best we can the dilemmas of our being. As students of Mormon history, we must sometimes face these bewildering complexities in others. The responsibility we share in struggling to understand our past means that we cannot ignore the possible insights of modern psychology. For both history and psychology contend that the past influences the present; both engage in historical reconstruction; and both advocate plural approaches and methods in explaining human behavior. If viewed as primarily heuristic rather than scientific, at least from the perspective of the historian, psychology can help us refine our knowledge of the past, thereby greatly improving the entire historical and biographical enterprise.<sup>1</sup>

The use of formal psychology in history, including Freudian psychoanalytical theory and subsequent related schools of thought, has been popularly termed “psychohistory.”<sup>2</sup> Yet it would be a mistake to think of psychohistory as a new field or as a rigid science with its own methods. Rather, the psychohistorian—“a student of history with a sharpened sensibility”<sup>3</sup>—produces what American and Mormon historian Richard L. Bushman prefers to call “psychologically informed” history.<sup>4</sup>

Psychohistory draws upon general and specific theories of human personality which lead to a “meaningful complexity” that helps to integrate the various aspects of any biographical problem: unconscious impulses and processes, the conscious

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self, and one’s setting.<sup>5</sup> Psychohistory can help us better understand the “meaning” of a particular event, even if it cannot provide a simple explanation of it.<sup>6</sup> Nor does any one psychological theory have a monopoly on empirical support or offer a completely adequate and satisfying unified theory of human behavior.

Not surprisingly, most psychohistory is actually psychobiography, since psychohistorical analysis is best suited to men and women about whom psychological explanations can be developed and tested.<sup>8</sup> What is especially distinctive about psychohistory is that the historian or biographer usually attempts to understand and explain the entire life, or notable periods of it, of his or her subject in “terms of a consciously thought-out psychological interpretation

[or interpretations] of that subject’s personality.”<sup>9</sup> Simply put, psychohistory represents the application—explicit or implicit—of psychology, usually theories of human personality, in trying to understand the behavior of individuals and groups in the past.

Serious interest in psychological approaches to history began in 1896 when British writer Havelock Ellis described biography as “applied psychology.” Interestingly, both in regards to Mormon historiography as well as to American psychohistory in general, one of the earliest American psychohistories was I. Woodbridge Riley’s 1902 biography of Joseph Smith, *The Founder of Mormonism: A Psychological Study of Joseph Smith, Jr.* (New York: Dodd, Mead). Although flawed by today’s standards because of its heavy dependence on the “scientific” psychology of the turn of the century, Riley’s psychobiography nonetheless raised important questions about Joseph Smith’s childhood, his relationship to his parents, his adolescence, and his responses to his environment.

Other “psychological biographies” followed Riley’s study and especially Sigmund Freud’s 1909 visit to the United States

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and the American publication of his seminal *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* in 1920.<sup>10</sup> These included Freud's own pathbreaking but flawed analysis of Leonardo di Vinci's childhood, Katherine Anthony's "psychological biography" of Margaret Fuller, Preserved Smith's "psychoanalytical" study of Martin Luther, Ralph V. Harlow's biography of Samuel Adams, Joseph Wood Krutch and Marie Bonaparte (separately) on Edgar Allen Poe, Gerald W. Johnson on John Randolph, Leon Pierce Clark's "psychobiography" of Abraham Lincoln, and Lewis Mumford on Herman Melville.<sup>11</sup> Yet despite some useful insights, most scholars today agree that these psychoanalytical studies—filled with jargon and highly judgmental—"deserved the cool reception they met."<sup>12</sup>

Learning from the excesses of their predecessors, more recent psychobiographers have succeeded in producing some fine biographical writing—psychohistorical or otherwise. Representative examples are Leon Edel's monumental five-volume biography of Henry James, Alexander and Juliette George's perceptive analysis of Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House, R. C. Tucker on Stalin, psychiatrist John E. Mack's study of T. E. Lawrence, appropriately titled *A Prince of Our Disorder*, W. Jackson Bate's masterful biography of Samuel Johnson, R. G. L. Waite's analysis of Adolf Hitler as a "psychopathic God," and M. Solomon on Ludwig Beethoven.<sup>13</sup>

As an interpretive tool, the use of psychology in history has proven problematic, its value condemned and praised.<sup>14</sup> Applying psychology to the past can mean tackling irrational and unchanging features of human nature, whereas most readers would no doubt rather encounter a "record of reason and optimism fulfilled, evidence of progress, a chronicle of challenges successfully met."<sup>15</sup> Specifically, psychological theories—especially Freudian psychoanalysis—have been criticized for being too flexible and easily misapplied, based on unreliable data, too narrowly focussed on the neurotic and psychotic, excessively reductionistic, or judgmental. In inexperienced hands, psychological approaches to history can produce one-dimensional, simplistic, even cruel portraits; circular analyses, postulating childhood events from adult actions; jargon-laden studies, "as if the use of a private and developed professional language could endow [historians] with a professional identity"; or "a clinical exposition instead of a true biography."<sup>16</sup>

Since the 1950s, a consensus has emerged that the Freudian emphasis on the unavoidable effects of childhood experience on adult behavior no longer has, if it ever did, the status of a "fact." Thus historians and biographers would do well to evaluate carefully their analyses before assigning theories of

psycho-sexual development a significant causative role.<sup>17</sup> Indeed, for many psychohistorians, psychobiographical reconstruction—that is, the assumption that a specific adult behavior requires a specific childhood trauma, even where historical evidence is lacking—is usually unjustified. In fact, one thoughtful psychohistorian recommends, "the case for banning [it] altogether in psychobiography is a fairly strong one."<sup>18</sup> Finally, the historian or biographer using psychology must keep in mind that their own psychological reactions can distort their materials so that their discussion may actually reveal more about themselves than about their subjects.<sup>19</sup>

Most of the criticisms leveled at psychology in history result from misunderstanding. Psychologists (including psychiatrists) are usually untrained in history and more liable to pay insufficient attention to primary source material, to historical and cultural differences, and to misinterpret social-historical context. At the same time, historians typically have a limited knowledge of psychological theory, lack firsthand clinical experience, and tend to rely on popular approaches to psychological theory which may or may not be supported by research. Clearly, however, the remedy is not to ignore the possible advantages of psychology, but to have individuals get training in both historiography and psychology or to develop working relationships between historians and

psychologists.<sup>20</sup>

The case for the responsible use of psychology in history, especially biography, is a strong one. While the above and other criticisms suggest that some kinds of questions probably cannot be answered about some individuals, they in no way preclude the developing of psychological interpretations for which there is adequate evidence. The psychobiographer in particular has at his or her disposal a "broader spectrum of behavior through more decades of life than has the analyst with a living patient"<sup>21</sup> and may be more sensitive to particular dimensions of the life of his or her subject than the historian.

Psychology can be used in many ways other than to infer causal relationships between childhood experience and adult behavior. In fact, its greatest contributions to history and biography may lie in interpreting evidence without always attempting to relate adult behavior to childhood acts, as well as in its attention to conflict, multiple significance, and phenomena of ambivalence, identification, repression, and projection. Psychology has "thrust fingers of light into the cave of the human mind"; "deepened our sense of the complexities, the arcane tides, of personality"; and "enabled us to penetrate some of the dark corners of motive and desire, to detect patterns of action, and sense the symbolic value of word and gesture."<sup>22</sup>

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Good psychohistory and psychobiography demonstrate a concern for richness and complexity; for intention versus the unintentional; for unconscious drives; and for the roots of creativity, including religious experience. Such historians are sensitive to anguish and its resolution. They explore ambition, competition, technology, achievement, and rootlessness. They also argue the “seemingly unobjectionable point, which some students of history still do not accept, that the historian as scientist cannot solve every problem by attending to the most readily accessible reasons, the most ‘rational’ causes, alone.”

Good psychohistory does not attempt to “prove” universal laws of human behavior. Rather, it suggests that “common psychological impulses and mechanisms invite attention to altogether new problems, to the multiple levels of perceived reality, and to the psychological strategies of contented and discontented alike.”<sup>23</sup>

At the same time, when faced with a puzzling historical phenomenon, the conscientious psychohistorian does not attempt to suggest that *all* possible psychological explanations may be “true” but evaluates and compares alternative explanations in terms of their plausibility.<sup>24</sup>

Psychology can allow the biographer to see behaviors he or she might not otherwise notice: alterations between active and passive states; how their subjects relate to others; if their behavior indicates that they retain fantasies of omnipotence; whether they are burdened with guilt; and how these enable us to understand people more clearly. Psychohistorians can increase our understanding of the private world of their subjects; they can uncover hidden patterns between their subjects’ childhood, adolescence, and later feelings, without necessarily postulating causal connections; they can help us share their subjects’ feelings and beliefs and perceive how their subjects’ subjective worlds become externalized.<sup>25</sup>

If we can agree that within us are urges we are not always aware of and that we “defend” ourselves in ways we are not always aware of, then the criticisms of psychology in history and biography are largely mitigated. For even if the unconscious cannot be examined “scientifically,” few of us would deny that something like it acts within us.<sup>26</sup> Increasingly, in fact, it has become difficult to justify written history and biography that does not consider psychology in a subject’s life. Among historians, an interest in psychological theory has already generated studies of sexuality; of religion; of women in society; of marriage and divorce; of conflict between the generations; of discontent among the young; and of aging and dying.

More than ever, the historian who today “disdains formal psychology does so at his [or her] peril.”<sup>27</sup> At the same time,

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the psychologist writing history “simply *must* learn about the cultural and historical context of his or her subject”<sup>28</sup> so as not to overemphasize the pathological or possible influence of childhood trauma. These shortcomings can best be avoided by integrating psychological approaches with social and historical considerations, by analyzing not just pathology but strengths and adaptive capacities, and by studying the effects on a person of the entire life cycle, not just childhood. In spite of the errors that have occasionally arisen from the dogmatic use of theories of personality, their many positive contributions

indicate that they are of fundamental importance in psychobiography and psychohistory. The challenge is to use them judiciously, to avoid aspects which evidence suggests are incorrect, and to consider their implications carefully while evaluating the available biographical and historical evidence.

For instance, early childhood experience, such as breast feeding or toilet training, rarely directly affects adult personality. Rather, early experience shapes early personality, which influences the later environments, which influence later experience, which affects personality, and so on. A particular event or experience can have a variety of possible effects, depending on one’s personality, environment, and the structure of subsequent environments and experiences. Furthermore, life is such that there are usually a variety of paths leading to a

particular outcome.<sup>29</sup>

Where evidence on early experience is available, the effects of such experiences should probably not be applied directly to adult personality, but rather “traced through a sequence of intervening stages and processes.”<sup>30</sup> And in the absence of such evidence one should especially avoid some early developmental explanations, since accurate reconstruction, even with the best of psychological theories, is very difficult. While some theories should probably be revised, if not abandoned, other concepts, such as unconscious motives and conflicts, identification, and defense mechanisms, may prove useful for careful biographers and historians who “probe in sympathy,” defining “the myths that order [their] subjects’ experience and that offer the keys to [their] natures.”<sup>31</sup>

WITHIN Mormon studies, past attempts at psychologically informed history and biography have tended to focus, not surprisingly, on the life of Church founder Joseph Smith.<sup>32</sup> With varying degrees of success and competency, the most notable of these past attempts include Riley’s above-mentioned psychological study of Joseph Smith, Walker Franklin Pierce’s analysis of Book of Mormon authorship, E. E. Erickson’s *The Psychological and Ethical Aspects of Mormon Group Life*, Fawn Brodie’s full-scale biography of Joseph Smith,

*No Man Knows My History*, Howard Booth's "personality study" of Joseph Smith, Robert Flanders's insightful treatment of Joseph Smith in "Dream and Nightmare," T. L. Brink's article on "Joseph Smith: The Verdict of Depth Psychology," Eugene and Bruce Campbell's use of *anomie* in their discussion of "Divorce Among Mormon Polygamists," Leonard Arrington's suggestion that "projection" may help explain Brigham Young's violent rhetoric, James Allen's application of cognitive dissonance theory to the failed millennialist expectations of the 1860s, and my own speculative essay on Joseph Smith and the hazards of charismatic leadership.<sup>33</sup>

Most recently, C. Jess Groesbeck's psychoanalytic analyses of Joseph Smith's youth and the Smith family's dreams and visions represent the most explicit and sophisticated use of psychological theory to have been attempted thus far in Mormon historiography.<sup>34</sup>

Of the above, Fawn Brodie's 1945 biography deserves special comment. Building on earlier works, Brodie's important biography wove together various approaches, including psychology. But because of its naturalistic assumptions, Brodie's book has been criticized in part for being "explicitly psychoanalytical."<sup>35</sup> Yet Brodie's use of psychology was implicit and indirect. She was sensitive to the subtleties of human personality development and raised issues of particular relevance to psychology—conflict, family relationships, and fantasy/reality testing, for example—without postulating necessary causal connections between childhood and adulthood. She did not rely on an explicit theoretical framework, such as psychoanalysis, and avoided psychological jargon. In fact, not until the second edition of *No Man Knows My History* appeared in 1971 did Brodie attempt an admittedly simplistic psychological discussion of Joseph Smith, and then only in three pages of her concluding "Supplement."<sup>36</sup>

The future of psychologically informed Mormon history and biography appears promising, especially as the value of psychological insight becomes increasingly apparent to careful researchers. "The twentieth century speaks of defense mechanisms, inferiority complexes, repressions, rationalizations, and sublimations," Mormon historian and biographer Ronald Walker has noted, "and these insights have an important and unfulfilled role in Mormon biography."<sup>37</sup> "Without going overboard with [psychological] terminology," Walker's colleague Davis Bitton continued,

one should be able to introduce comparisons and insights from psychological literature that would illuminate such experiences in the life experience of individual Mormons as friction within families, mid-life crises, and tensions between the expectations created by Mormon conditioning and the often

divergent realities of life, as well as the Mormon missionary experience, the process of religious conversion and the "fluctuating nature of faith," and human weakness generally, a frank acknowledgment of which "will usually turn out to be both more interesting and ultimately more respectful toward the subject than a cover-up job."<sup>38</sup>

Psychological theories could be profitably applied to the following areas of Mormon history and biography, at least: Joseph Smith's relationship with his parents, especially his

mother, and his siblings; the consequences of the religious differences between Joseph Smith Sr. and Lucy Smith on themselves and their children; the trauma of Joseph Smith's leg operation; Joseph Smith's adolescence and the so-called "identity crisis"; Joseph Smith's early religious experiences; Joseph Smith as a charismatic leader; Joseph Smith's practice and denial of polygamy, as well as nineteenth-century Mormon defenses of polygamy, and the phenomena of projection and conversion reaction; Heber J. Grant's response to the Word of Wisdom and conversion reaction; Heber J. Grant's insomnia; the physical problems of George Albert Smith and their possible psychological consequences; Heber C. Kimball's apparent insecurity during his declining years; the sibling relationship between Parley P. and Orson Pratt; parent-child

relationships in nineteenth-century polygamous (i.e., single-parent) households; and father-son relationships among the Church hierarchy, especially the George Q. Cannon and Joseph F. Smith families.

One of the most intriguing recent discoveries using psychological theory is Groesbeck's finding of an apparently genetic predisposition toward depression among progenitors and descendants of Joseph Smith and collateral family lines.<sup>39</sup>

For the present, and future, what is most needed in Mormon psychohistory is a competent grasp of historical facts, a broad understanding of historical movements, and a careful, thorough study of the spectrum of psychological and personality theories that does not rely on jargon or "popularized" approaches, coupled with compassion, caution, patience, and an ability to live, however uncomfortably, with ambiguity. Grasping a life "inwardly requires mastery of its full documentary remains" and "conversance with the whole run of personalities, institutions, and events, and the whole congeries of ideas, usages, and values, involved. To top that off, it takes an intellectual and emotional stunt both strenuous and delicate."<sup>40</sup>

Perhaps the psychologically informed study of lives is "hopelessly complex." True, the research called for is often difficult to come by, and *absolute* certainty in the study of

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human lives is elusive. But assumptions about the causes of behavior and the long-range effects of different actions upon this behavior are inextricably a part of our personal, intellectual, and professional lives, and our society. We can only ignore the use of psychology at the cost of incomplete, inadequate, and unsatisfying analyses. Creating "a convincing blend of traditional narrative and interpretation of psychological clues will not be easy," Davis Bitton reminds us, but the challenge and obligation are there.<sup>41</sup>

## NOTES

1. See Geoffrey Cocks and Travis L. Crosby, eds., *Psychohistory. Readings in the Method of Psychology, Psychoanalysis, and History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), x, xi, Peter Loewenberg, "Psychoanalysis, the Social Scientist, and the Historian," in Cocks and Crosby, 41, and Paul Murray Kendall, *The Art of Biography* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1965), 121.
2. See William McKinley Runyan, *Life Histories and Psychobiography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 203; see also B. Glad, "Contributions of Psychobiography," J. Knutson, ed., *Handbook of Political Psychology* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973), 296.
3. Robert J. Brugger, ed., *Our Selves/Our Past* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 25.
4. Richard L. Bushman, "On the Uses of Psychology: Conflict and Conciliation in Benjamin Franklin," *History and Theory* 5 (1966), 3-234.
5. Runyan, 217; Brugger, 22.
6. Bruce Mazlish, "Group Psychology and Problems of Contemporary History," in Cocks and Crosby, 232.
7. Runyan, 217; Brugger, 22.
8. Cocks and Crosby, 310, Runyan, 204, see also Rudolph Binion, "Doing Psychohistory," in Cocks and Crosby, 69. But psychobiography "cannot be divorced from a study of society" (Hans Meyerhoff, "On Psychoanalysis as History," in Cocks and Crosby, 26, see also Erick Erickson, *Young Man Luther* [New York: Knopf, 1957], 20).
9. R. C. Tucker, "The Georges' Wilson Reexamined: An Essay on Psychobiography," in *American Political Science Review* 71 (1977), 606.
10. For Freud's impact on America, see Nathan G. Hale Jr., *Freud and the Americans: The Beginnings of Psychoanalysis in the United States, 1876-1917* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).
11. See Sigmund Freud, *Leonardo di Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood* (1910), in *Standard Edition* (London: Hogarth Press, 1957), 12: 3-82; Preserved Smith, "Luther's Early Development in the Light of Psycho-analysis," *American Journal of Psychology* 24 (1913): 360-77; Katherine Anthony, *Margaret Fuller: A Psychological Biography* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1920), Ralph V. Harlow, *Samuel Adams, Promoter of the American Revolution. A Study in Psychology and Politics* (New York: Holt, 1923), Joseph Wood Krutch, *Edgar Allan Poe: A Study in Genius* (New York: Knopf, 1926); Marie Bonaparte, *The Life and Works of Edgar Allan Poe: A Psychoanalytic Interpretation* (London: Imago Publishing Co., 1933), Gerald W. Johnson, *Randolph of Roanoke. A Political Fantastic* (New York: Minton, Balch, 1929); Leon Pierce Clark, *Lincoln: A Psychobiography* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933), and Lewis Mumford, *Herman Melville* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1929).
12. Brugger, 4.
13. Leon Edel, *Henry James*, 5 vols. (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1953-72), Alexander L. and Juliette L. George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study* (1956; New York: Dover, 1964), R. C. Tucker, *Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879-1929. A Study in History and Personality* (New York: Norton, 1973), John E. Mack, *A Prince of Our Disorder: The Life of T. E. Lawrence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976); W. Jackson Bate, *Samuel Johnson* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1977); R. G. L. Waite, *The Psychopathic God: Adolf Hitler* (New York: Basic Books, 1977); and M. Solomon, *Beethoven* (New York: Schirmer Books, 1977).
14. For a recent critique of psychoanalytic psychohistory, see David E. Stannard, *Shrinking History: On Freud and the Failure of Psychohistory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980). For a response, see Peter Gay, *Freud for Historians* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).
15. Brugger, 1.
16. Cocks and Crosby, x (see also Brugger, 18); Joseph M. Woods, "Some Considerations on Psycho-History," in Cocks and Crosby, 109; Kendall, 121; Berninger, 97; H. J. Eysenck, "What is Wrong with Psychoanalysis?" in Cocks and Crosby, 3-16. See also Mazlish, 232.
17. Cocks and Crosby, 78-79. This is not to say that in some instances the judicious and conservative use of theories of psycho-sexual development is not useful.
18. Runyan, 208.
19. Mazlish, 233. See also Robert Gittings, *The Nature of Biography* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978), 42-43.
20. Runyan, 231.
21. J. Cody, *After Great Pain. The Inner Life of Emily Dickinson* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 5.
22. Kendall, 121.
23. Brugger, 20.
24. Runyan, 49-50.
25. See Woods, 113; Harvey Asher, "Non-Psychoanalytic Approaches to National Socialism," in Cocks and Crosby, 279.
26. Brugger, 9.
27. Brugger, 6-7.
28. Runyan, 216.
29. Runyan, 209.
30. Runyan, 212.
31. Runyan, 221, Marc Pachter, "The Biographer Himself: An Introduction," in Marc Pachter, ed., *Telling Lives: The Biographer's Art* (Washington, D.C.: New Republic Books, 1979), 14.
32. Less restrained "psychological" analyses of Joseph Smith include those of Bernard DeVoto, who called Smith a "psychopath" ("The Centennial of Mormonism," *American Mercury* 19 [1930]: 5) and Kimball Young, who found him a "parapath" (*Isn't One Wife Enough?* [New York, 1954], 82). For a useful survey of scholarly and popular literature on Joseph Smith, see Thomas G. Alexander, "The Place of Joseph Smith in the Development of American Religion. A Historical Inquiry," *Journal of Mormon History* 5 (1978): 3-17.
33. Walter Franklin Pierce, "Psychological Tests for the Authorship of the Book of Mormon," *The American Journal of Psychology* 28 (July 1917): 373-89, E. E. Ericksen, *The Psychological and Ethical Aspects of Mormon Group Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1922), Fawn M. Brodie, *No Man Knows My History: The Life of Joseph Smith, the Mormon Prophet* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1945), Howard J. Booth, "An Image of Joseph Smith, Jr.," *Courage* 1 (September 1970), 15-14, Robert Bruce Flanders, "Dream and Nightmare: Nauvoo Revisited," in *The Restoration Movement: Essays in Mormon History*, eds. F. Mark McKiernan, Alma R. Blair, and Paul M. Edwards (Lawrence, KS: Coronado Press, 1973), 141-44, T. L. Brink, "Joseph Smith: The Verdict of Depth Psychology," *Journal of Mormon History* 3 (1976): 73-83; Eugene E. and Bruce Campbell, "Divorce Among Mormon Polygamists: Extent and Explanations," *Utah Historical Quarterly* 46 (Winter 1978): 4-23; Leonard J. Arrington, *Brigham Young, American Moses* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1985), 407, James B. Allen, *Trials of Discipleship: The Story of William Clayton, A Mormon* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 315-18, and Gary James Bergera, "Joseph Smith and the Hazards of Charismatic Leadership," *The John Whitmer Historical Association Journal* 6 (1986): 33-42.
34. C. Jess Groesbeck, "The Smiths and Their Dreams and Visions: A Psycho-historical Study of the First Mormon Family," *SUNSTONE* 12 (March 1988): 22-29, see also C. Jess Groesbeck, "Joseph Smith and His Path of Individuation: A Psychoanalytic Exploration in Mormonism," speech given at the 1986 Sunstone Theological Symposium.
35. See, for example, Hugh Nibley, *No Man's Land, That's Not History* (Salt Lake City: Bookcraft, 1946), 53-55, Ronald W. Walker, "The Challenge and Craft of Mormon Biography," *Brigham Young University Studies* 22 (Spring 1982), 2-189. For additional, more substantive criticisms, see Marvin S. Hill, "Secular or Sectarian History: A Critique of *No Man Knows My History*," *Church History* 43 (March 1974), 178-96.
36. Fawn M. Brodie, *No Man Knows My History: The Life of Joseph Smith, the Mormon Prophet*, 2d ed. (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1976), 418-20. Brodie may be criticized for restricting such an important discussion to only three pages.
37. Walker, 189.
38. Davis Bitton, "Mormon Biography," *Biography: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly* 4 (Winter 1981), 1: 11-13.
39. See Groesbeck, "The Smith and Their Dreams and Visions."
40. Binion, 70.
41. Bitton, 11.